Monday, April 01, 2024

A New and Important Book by Prof. Myra Tawfik on Canada’s Copyright History


Canada has slowly asserted an independent copyright position on the domestic and international fronts in spite of intense and immense pressure from the USA and the UK. That independence has taken a long time to achieve, and it has been denied or imperiled many times – including now.

Being something of a copyright nerd, I have a lot of books on Canadian and international copyright. Three of these books deal in various ways with the origins of copyright law in Canada in the 19th century.

The latest and most detailed book is by Prof. Myra Tawfik of the University of Windsor law faculty.  Her monograph published in 2023 is For the Encouragement of Learning: The Origins of Canadian Copyright Law  Myra Tawfik (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2023). (388 pages). Prof. Tawfik has excellent credentials and was cited twice in the landmark 2021 Supreme Court of  Canada decision of York University v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), 2021 SCC 32 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/jh8bc>. I am honoured that I was also cited in that decision, along with Prof. Ariel Katz and others. I also provided arguments on behalf of CARL that were very instrumental in the decision.

Prof. Tawfik’s book examines in great detail early Canadian statutes and practice from 1824 to 1867, and a summary of how all of these early developments were influential in what was to follow up to January 1, 1924 when the essence of Canada’s current Copyright Act was proclaimed into force “100 years after Francois Blanchet rose in the  Lower Canadian House of Assembly to introduce his Bill for the encouragement of learning” in 1824. 2024 is the centenary of this 1924 milestone which was itself a centenary of the 1824 event. It is too bad that the Canadian copyright academy appears to have thus far overlooked this centenary.

Canada finally stood on its own when in 1924, paradoxically by implementing a statute very similar the UK act of 1911, and finally cut the legal cord with the UK of the Colonial Laws Validity Act with the Statute of Westminster of 1931.

This 19th century history has been ignored for too long, perhaps because it has generally not been seen as immediately or very obviously relevant to the kind of copyright litigation we have seen in the last many decades and are now seeing.  That said, the Courts occasionally do explicitly reference the origins of Canadian copyright law – for example in Justice Binnie’s opinion in the 2002 Th├ęberge decision, which Prof. Tawfik does indeed mention.

Her book begins with an interesting introduction that highlights her thesis that Canadian copyright is a fusion of British common law tradition and European civil law tradition. She suggests that, in spite of the  colonial treatment of Canada in the 19th century, Canada (consisting mainly of “Upper Canada” and “Lower Canada” as they were then known) developed a normative approach aimed at “the encouragement of learning”.  The struggle to achieve these “imperatives” continues to this day, as Access Copyright and its protagonists deny the history and destiny of Canadian copyright law and seek to cut back on fair dealing by, among other thigs,  eliminating the word “education” from s. 29 of the Copyright Act.

In the period on which she mostly focuses, namely 1824 to 1867, registration was required for those seeking copyright rights. She has spent 15 years meticulously examining available data about the registrations from that time. Interesting lists are included in the appendices. She goes into great detail about the differences between Upper and Lower Canada in those days. Indeed, there are still some significant differences in how Quebec institutions, collectives, practitioners, and scholars approach copyright law compared to the rest of Canada. So, this background is not only interesting but potentially important.

The main theme of her book is that “…copyright’s earliest focus was on advancing literacy and learning by providing incentives to authors to disseminate their works. These authors were teachers, and the works they were producing  were school books.” This is well documented by her painstaking examination of registration activities and legislative developments in the 19th century and up to 1924.

Her first chapter deals with “Contextualizing Copyright in Nineteenth-Century British North America” and how British law, deriving from the 1710 Statute of Anne, and British common law, were imported to a certain extent into pre-confederation Upper and Lower Canada. This provides a fascinating political and historical perspective of the early 19th century in Canada and makes one wonder all the more about how confederations even took place in 1867 and the differences that still survive. There is a discussion about the “Right of Petition”, whereby persons could petition a legislature to buy multiple copies of a book for educational purposes.

Chapter 2 deals with the crucial role of the 1710 Statute of Anne and of American law, as enshrined in the US Constitution to “promote the progress of science and the useful arts.”

Chapter 3 deals mainly with the evolution of copyright law in Lower Canada. Interestingly, it shows that French law was not a part of the 19th century developments in Lower Canada and the “droit d’auteur” doctrines played no role until the early 20th  century, when Canada implemented moral rights in its copyright law.

Most of the balance of Prof. Tawfik’s book focuses on the importance of school books, their essential role in the education of children, and the politics and legal efforts to achieve these goals. This includes Chapters 5 and 6 on the 1832 Copyright Act, and Chapters 7 and 8 on the UK Copyright Act of 1842, including how it “put a tax on knowledge in Canada”.

Chapter 9 is an important look at copyright in the “Province of Canada” and a look at registrations as “proxies for overall trends in authorship and printing and publishing.”

Chapter 10 recounts the post-Confederation attempts by Canada to sever copyright ties with England, still very much our colonial master, by virtue of being able to disallow any Canadian law it did not fancy. The heroic Prime Minister Sir John Thompson even made a special voyage to London in 1894 to deal with Canadian copyright but tragically died en route. Canadians should never forget his efforts and his famous quote cited by Sara Bannerman and myself characterizing Canadian authors at that time  as “belonging rather to the future than the present.”

The book lives up to its promise in the introduction of showing how the “normative tradition of a particular body of law” can be useful to judges to “interpret its modern applications”. Indeed, Prof. Tawfik has demonstrated the focus on the encouragement of Canadian books and their essential production, protection, and injection into the Canadian educational system as a guiding principle throughout the 19th century in the various components of what is now Canada. Accordingly, it is fitting that there has been great interest in the last decade or so in the historical background of Canadian copyright law – and in tracing this back to the early, mid and late 19th century.

An indispensable companion to Prof. Tawfik’s book is Prof. Sara Bannerman’s 1913 The Struggle for Canadian Copyright, which begins with the 1842 British legislation and goes up to and including up to and even after 1971, the last major milestone in the extremely important Berne Convention.  This book “deals primarily with Canada’s experience  with the Berne Convention between 1886 and 1971.” I am quite honoured to see my name mentioned in the acknowledgments of this important book. Prof. Bannerman, who holds a Canada Research Chair at McMaster University, brings the perspective of an accomplished scholar who is not a lawyer to this important period. Another useful book is Dominion and Agency: Copyright and the Structuring of the Canadian Book Trade, 1867-1918. by Eli MacLaren of the Department of English at McGill University,. This was published in 2011. I am pleased to have both of these books on my shelf. Together with Prof. Tawfik’s recent book, they comprise a remarkable trilogy.

I can enthusiastically recommend all three of these books to any and all of the following:

·       Lawyers who may need to point out the normative tradition, the DNA, and other aspects of early Canadian copyright law and their relevance to modern Canadian copyright;

  • All Canadian copyright academics;
  •  Members of Canada’s library and archive community;
  •  All Canadian post-secondary and public libraries;
  •   Policy decision makers at the K-12 and post-secondary levels in Canada;
  • Any public servants concerned with copyright policy in Canada; and,
  • UK, American, Australian and other foreign copyright scholars who wish to be well informed about Canada’s copyright history.

 HPK

Friday, February 23, 2024

Access Copyright Adds To Its Lengthy Litany Of Litigation Losses

It is easy to lose track of how many major decisions that Access Copyright has LOST in the last twenty years, which include three straight losses in the Supreme Court of Canada (CCH in 2004, Alberta in 2012, and York in 2021) and now a very notable Federal Court decision that is likely to be upheld in any appeal.

The latest is the landmark ruling by Justice Aylen of the Federal Court in Province of Alberta et al v. Access Copyright 2024 FC 292, rendered February 22, 2024.

I have quoted at length from Justice Aylen’s ruling because it is very long (121 pages) and detailed and will be a challenge even to experienced copyright lawyers to read carefully on short notice. For whatever reason, it does not have a table of contents. But it is a “must read” for every copyright lawyer, educator and copyright policy official in Canada. It was issued very quickly and decisively, following final arguments just over a month ago on January 17 and 18, 2024. At times in this blog, I refer to Access Copyright as “AC”. I refer to the plaintiffs, Province of Alberta et al, as the “Consortium”.

 Justice Aylen states the issues, as agreed by the parties, at the outset:

 

[3] The parties have brought a motion for summary trial in which they have jointly asked the Court to answer the following three questions:

1. Have the Plaintiffs been licensees from 2013 onward?

2. If the Plaintiffs have not been licensees from 2013 onward, are the Plaintiffs nevertheless liable in equity to pay Access Copyright?

3. If the Plaintiffs are not liable in equity to pay Access Copyright, is Access Copyright entitled to retain the 2010-2012 overpayment in any event?

 Spoiler alert – here is the bottom line of the ruling at page 121:

THIS COURT ORDERS that:

1. It is declared that the Plaintiffs overpaid Access Copyright for tariff royalties during the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 by an amount equal to $2.35 per full-time equivalent student [Overpayment]. The total amount of the Overpayment as paid by each Plaintiff, exclusive of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest and inclusive of the Copyright Board-set interest factor and taxes, is as set out in Schedule B to the Statement of Claim.

2. It is declared that the Plaintiffs were not licensees of the Approved 2010-2015 Tariff from 2013 to 2015.

3. It is declared that the Plaintiffs are not liable to Access Copyright in equity, or otherwise, in relation to any of the claims advanced by Access Copyright in this proceeding.

4. It is declared that Access Copyright is not entitled to retain the Overpayment.

5. Access Copyright shall pay to each of the Plaintiffs a refund of the Overpayment, in the amounts as set out in Schedule B to the Statement of Claim.

6. Access Copyright shall pay to the Plaintiffs pre-judgment interest on the Overpayment, calculated pursuant to subsection 36(1) of the Federal Courts Act.

7. Access Copyright shall pay to the Plaintiffs post-judgment interest on the Overpayment, calculated pursuant to subsection 37(1) of the Federal Courts Act.

8. Access Copyright shall pay to the Plaintiffs their costs of this motion and the underlying proceeding calculated based on the mid-point of Column III of Tariff B [the Tariff], with the exception of the documentary production costs which shall be calculated based on the mid-point of Column IV of the Tariff.

9. Access Copyright shall pay to the Plaintiffs their reasonable disbursements of the motion and the underlying proceeding. In the event that the parties are unable to reach an agreement, the disbursements shall be assessed by an assessment officer.

10. Access Copyright’s counterclaim is hereby dismissed.

 “Mandy Aylen”

Judge

 

The essence of the Consortium’s claim as stated by Justice Aylen in the very lengthy and detailed recitation of facts was this:

 

[36] On February 16, 2018, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in York University, the Plaintiffs commenced this action against Access Copyright seeking, among other relief: (a) a declaration that Access Copyright’s tariffs as certified by the Board are not mandatory; (b) a declaration that the Plaintiffs overpaid Access Copyright for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 by an amount equal to $2.35 per FTE student; and (c) payment by Access Copyright of a refund or monetary damages to the Plaintiffs in the amount of the overpayment, namely $25,493,109.36, together with pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. (highlight added)

 Further:

 

[83] In a letter dated May 4, 2016 [2016 Letter], the Plaintiffs requested a refund from Access Copyright of the difference between the per FTE student rate of $4.81 that was paid in 2010 through 2012 under the continuation tariff and the $2.46 per FTE student rate that was ultimately certified, in accordance with section 15(5) of the Approved 2010-2015 Tariff. The total amount sought by the Plaintiffs was $25,493,109.36. (highlight added)

 

Note that this figure does NOT include interest due.

 This is a  lot of money but the matters of principle are even more important. Justice Aylen pays significant attention and reliance on the Supreme Court’s 2021 decision in the York case, which came down in the midst of this litigation, and the SCC’s 2015 decision in CBC v. SODRAC. I was counsel for CARL in both these cases. I acted for David Lametti, as he then was, and Ariel Katz in the SODRAC case, and made complementary submissions to Ariel Katz in the York case. The York decision relied on the brilliant scholarship of Ariel Katz in his “Spectre I” and “Spectre II” papers. I am proud to have worked with Ariel over the years to demolish the myth of the “spectre” of mandatory tariffs. He deserves the main credit.

 AC’s main argument was that it was entitled, based on the very amorphous mostly common law of “equity”  and other stretches of the common law, to keep this money. But the Copyright Act does not provide for equitable relief for an entity such as AC that is neither a rights owner or exclusive licensee. She rules that:

 

[259] Accordingly, I find that none of Access Copyright’s asserted common law doctrines apply so as to prevent the Plaintiffs from seeking a return of their royalty overpayments.

 

Justice Aylen has some scathing findings re other aspects of AC’s submissions:

 

[192] While this is sufficient to dispose of Access Copyright’s meritless assertion that participating in the tariff-setting process at all levels (before the Board, this Court, and the Federal Court of Appeal) constituted an offer to pay, the rationale for why the Plaintiffs would have participated sheds further light on the absurdity of Access Copyright’s assertion. At the relevant time, the Supreme Court had not yet decided York University, so it was possible that the Plaintiffs would be bound to a statutory licence. If that were ultimately the case, it is obvious that it was in the Plaintiffs’ interests to participate and advocate for a tariff lower than the one being proposed by Access Copyright ($15.00 for 2010 to 2012 and $9.50 for 2013 to 2015), which was an increase of $10.19 and $4.69 per FTE over and above the royalty under the Approved 2005-2009 Tariff.  (highlight added)

 

[224] To interpret the Copyright Act as allowing equitable remedies that permit recovery of a remedy provided for under subsection 68.2(1), but not otherwise available to Access Copyright under the Copyright Act (because the Plaintiffs were not licensees), would be incompatible with the object of the Copyright Act and result in absurdity. Parliament has struck a careful balance between users’ and creators’ rights, as well as with respect to the risk of collective societies developing monopolistic powers. In striking that balance, Parliament chose to make statutory licenses voluntary. To permit Access Copyright to obtain through equity what it cannot obtain under the Copyright Act would turn the copyright regime on its head, by effectively making voluntary statutory licences mandatory through the use of equitable remedies. Under the circumstances, it is “irresistibly clear” that the statutory scheme precludes Access Copyright from seeking the equitable remedies it claims in the circumstances of this proceeding [see Moore, supra at para 70]. (highlight added)

 

[227] This concern lays bare one of the problems with Access Copyright’s equitable claims. While Access Copyright has gone to great lengths to assert in its submissions that it is not making an infringement claim (notwithstanding the language used in its pleading), Access Copyright grounds its equitable claims in the Plaintiffs’ acts of compensable copying. But compensable copying in the absence of a licence is merely an act of infringement—an unauthorized exercise of the owner’s exclusive right. As stated by the Supreme Court in York University, a person who has not paid or offered to pay is not licensed and may be liable for infringement. To permit Access Copyright to obtain an equitable remedy for compensable copying would have the effect of using equity to make the tariff de facto mandatory or permitting Access Copyright (a non-exclusive licensee) to recover for infringement, either of which would turn the copyright regime on its head. (highlight added)

 

[228] Through its equitable claims, considered collectively, Access Copyright ultimately seeks payment by the Plaintiffs of an amount equivalent to the royalties the Plaintiffs would have owed had they been licensees, which would result in the inequities and absurdities addressed above. (highlight added)

 

[229] For these reasons, I conclude that, in the circumstances, it is not open to this Court to award the equitable remedies sought by Access Copyright as to do so would turn the copyright regime on its head. (highlight added)

 

[273] For the reasons stated above, my determination in relation to each of the issues is as follows:

1. Were the Plaintiffs licensees in 2013, 2014 and 2015? No.

2. If the Plaintiffs were not licensees from 2013 to 2015, are the Plaintiffs nevertheless liable in equity, or otherwise, to pay Access Copyright an amount equivalent to the tariffs royalties for 2013 to 2015? No.

3. If the Plaintiffs are not liable in equity, or otherwise, to pay Access Copyright an amount equivalent to the tariff royalties for 2013 to 2015, is Access Copyright entitled to retain the 2010 to 2012 overpayment in any event? No.

 

As to costs, Justice Aylen rules:            

 

[296] Accordingly, I find that the Plaintiffs are entitled to their costs to be calculated in accordance with the mid-point of Column III of the Tariff for all steps in this proceeding, other than documentary production steps which shall be calculated in accordance with the mid-point of Column IV of the Tariff.

 My overall assessment:

 

1.      This ruling is  incredibly important, detailed, meticulous, and comprehensive. It reviews the evidence, the arguments, and the applicable case law in unusual and commendable detail.

2.      I would say, in my opinion and based upon my long experience, that any appeal by AC is unlikely to succeed.

3.      Needless to say, an affirmation by the Federal Court of Appeal would be even further devastating to Access Copyright.

4.      Moreover, any appeal might spark a cross appeal as to costs, which is the one aspect where AC got some sympathy. Column 3 costs, as awarded to the Consortium, are at most a small fraction of actual costs.

5.      Although his cases technically began in 2018, there was a lengthy leadup between the parties at the Copyright Board and in the lobbying corridors. The Consortium deserves credit  for fighting for justice for Canadian educators for so long.

6.      This ruling is anything but shocking. It confirms that Canada, like the USA, does NOT have mandatory tariffs and that fair dealing is important and a key aspect of the copyright bargain.

7.      Given the recent downsizing and restructuring of AC and the departure of Roanie Levy, it will be interesting to see if it now takes a less aggressive litigation approach or doubles down and becomes even more aggressive.

 Finally, this case provided an interesting contrast in advocacy and approach:

·       AC’s positions were very aggressive and sought to turn the Copyright Act “on its head”, as the ruling repeatedly states. AC’s oral advocacy, as led by Sarit Batner of McCarthy’s, was very dramatic, perhaps even melodramatic and too much so, even allowing for the “meritless” and “absurdity” aspect of many of AC’s key submissions..

·       The Consortium’s positions and oral advocacy, led by Aidan O’Neill of Fasken,  were much more restrained, concise, and even understated. In the result, this approach was clearly far more convincing in this instance.

 

Let me remind readers, as  always, that nothing in this blog is legal advice.

 HPK

Note: I've corrected the above to reflect that the final arguments were on January 17 & 18, not February 17 & 18.

Monday, January 22, 2024

Province of Alberta et al v Access Copyright - Court File T-326-18

 I watched with great interest the two-day summary judgment hearing on January 17 and 18, 2024 in Province of Alberta et al v. Access Copyright. This particular proceeding has been going on for almost five years, and the overall confrontation between these parties for much longer. I would expect, with the inevitable appeals, that it could go on potentially for years to come. There is much that I could say about all this, but I won’t say it now.

I will, however, say this. For the purpose of its so-called equitable claim in this litigation, Access Copyright argued in court that the 2012 amendment to the Copyright Act adding the word “education” to fair dealing was not significant – since it wants to assert that the educators had no basis to rely on greater fair dealing rights and somehow, via equity, should be forced to pay up for their allegedly uncompensated use since then. As Access Copyright wrote in its memorandum for the court, “In sum, as the Plaintiffs themselves made clear, nothing within the Copyright Modernization Act converted fair dealing into free dealing.”

 On the other hand, Access Copyright is loudly and flagrantly contradicting this position outside the court room in its aggressive campaign to get rid of the word “education”, since it asserts on the lobbying front that the addition of this word education has cost it over $200 million dollars.

e.g. “TORONTO [July 13, 2023] Due to changes in fair dealing provisions in the Copyright Act, since 2012, Canadian writers, visual artists, and publishers - an indispensable part of Canada’s culture - have been deprived of over $200 million in unpaid royalties under tariffs certified by the Copyright Board of Canada”

Taking contradictory positions in different forums at the same time is, at the very least, unusual and potentially problematic. Go figure.

BTW, the educators relied very heavily on the SODRAC and York decisions from the SCC, wherein the submissions of Prof. Ariel Katz, Prof. David Lametti as he then was in the SODRAC case, and myself were determinative.

HPK