Wednesday, November 18, 2026
Thursday, June 04, 2026
Canada’s AI Supposed Strategy
Here’s the picture version:
Here’s the full text version – apparently not available as a
PDF or Word document.
https://ised-isde.canada.ca/site/ised/en/canadas-national-artificial-intelligence-strategy-ai-all
A quick look indicates:
- No definition of what “sovereign” or “sovereignty” means either technically or legally in the context of the internet, which those of us of a certain age will remember was built on the notion that “Information wants to be free”
- The word “compute” is now, according to the Canadian government, a noun
- There is no mention of the elephant in the AI room, namely copyright. Current litigation in Canada and elsewhere has the potential to severely compromise and even cripple the utility and potential of AI
- Canada’s government will do what it usually does best – throw hundreds of millions and now likely billions up into the air – and now into the cloud. This will keep lots of lawyers, lobbyists, telcos, and consultants happy for a while. Then what?
HPK
PS - here's a follow up from the Government, which has finally connected AI with the word "copyright". More from me in due course.
Tuesday, May 05, 2026
The Appointment of Giuseppina “Pina” D’Agostino to the Federal Court
The appointment of Giuseppina “Pina” D’Agostino to the
Federal Court is great news! The Federal
Court, where most of the important intellectual property cases in Canada are
heard, has had only a few judges who come mainly from the IP world.
Prof. D’Agostino has had a prolific, prominent, and influential role in the IP
academy and particularly in
copyright law. She was the Founding Director of IP Osgoode, and organized provocative and
balanced events – for example this conference on the aftermath of the Canadian
Broadcasting Corp. v. SODRAC 2003 Inc., 2015 SCC 57 (CanLII), [2015] 3 SCR
615, <https://canlii.ca/t/gm8b0> decision. I was honoured to have participated
both in the SCC hearing and the subsequent IP Osgoode event. That SODRAC
decision was crucial in turn to the decision in York University v. Canadian
Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), 2021 SCC 32 (CanLII), [2021]
2 SCR 734, <https://canlii.ca/t/jh8bc>
which held that Access Copyright’s
“tariffs” on educational institutions are not “mandatory”.
Her 2008 article Healing Fair Dealing? A Comparative Copyright Analysis of
Canada’s Fair Dealing to U.K. Fair Dealing and U.S. Fair Use
proved to be very influential in the
SCC decision in Alberta (Education) v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency
(Access Copyright), 2012 SCC 37 (CanLII), [2012] 2 SCR 345, <https://canlii.ca/t/fs0v5>.
See para. 19. This was the only academic article cited by the Court. It was
a balanced and prescient comparative analysis of fair dealing. I am reminded that the intervener factum that I filed with Prof.
Ariel Katz for the intervener Centre for Innovation Law and Policy of the
Faculty of Law University of Toronto was the only factum in that important case
to include her important article (see para. 21). Permit me to point out that she
cited me twice in that article.
Her legacy at Osgoode Hall Law School is in the capable
hands of her colleague Prof. Carys Craig. Both
follow in the footsteps of the illustrious emeritus Prof. David Vaver.
This is a very welcome appointment. We congratulate the Hon.
Giuseppina D’Agostino and wish her all the very best. We look forward to her
jurisprudence for many years to come.
HPK
Friday, March 20, 2026
Blacklock’s Pyrrhic Victory in the Federal Court of Appeal
I have
blogged about Blacklock’s war against fair dealing for over a decade during
which it has been protracting its long lasting litany of litigation losses.
This began notably with Justice Barnes’ 2016 decision in a case in which he ruled
against Blacklock’s and stated that “Although there are certainly some
troubling aspects to Blacklock’s business practices it is unnecessary
to resolve the Attorney General’s allegation that this litigation constitutes a
form of copyright abuse by a copyright troll.” See 1395804 Ontario Ltd. v. Canada
(Attorney General), 2016 FC 1255 (CanLII), [2017] 2 FCR 256, <https://canlii.ca/t/gvrbx>. Incidentally,
the Government’s lawyer on that case, Alexandre Kaufman, has since been
appointed as a judge of the Ontario Superior Court.
In 2024, the
Federal Court gave the Government another decisive victory in its long struggle
to resist the controversial business practices of Blacklock’s and its hostility
to fair dealing. The long and careful decision of the Federal Court by Justice
Roy – see 1395804 Ontario Ltd. (Blacklock's Reporter) v. Canada
(Attorney General), 2024 FC 829 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/k4zfr> - ended with these declarations:
- It
is hereby declared that, having purchased the only type of subscription
available, which was allowing the acquisition of the password needed to
access articles produced by Blacklock’s Reporter, Parks Canada’s use of
the password in the circumstances of this case constitutes fair dealing
under section
29 of the Copyright
Act.
- It
is hereby declared that the licit acquisition and use of a password, if it
is otherwise a technological protection measure, does not constitute the
circumvention of the technological protection measures of the Copyright
Act.
- There
is no order as to costs.
Blacklock’s
appealed. After more than 5 months following the October 7, 2025 appeal hearing,
which I
described as “ possibly the most unusual, if not bizarre,
courtroom event I’ve ever seen”,
the Federal Court of Appeal (“FCA”) has finally issued its judgment on March
19, 2026.. See 1395804 Ontario Ltd. (Blacklock's Reporter) v. Canada
(Attorney General), 2026 FCA 56 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/kjxld>. The reasons for decision by Webb, JA conclude
that:
[43] As
a result, in my view, there is no practical utility in rendering either
declaration as neither declaration settles a “live
controversy” between the parties. Therefore, the Federal Court erred in
making the declarations. I would allow the appeal and set aside the Judgment of
the Federal Court. Rendering the Judgment that the Federal Court should have
made, I would dismiss the Attorney General’s motion for summary judgment with
respect to the requested declarations.
and goes on to award costs to Blacklock’s to be determined
if not agreed upon.
This ruling:
- Essentially says that Justice Roy was wrong to make the declarations that he did below but does not rule that the declarations were substantively wrong
- Incongruously and incorrectly concludes that there was no “live controversy” involved
- Incorrectly ruled that “these
declarations lack any practical utility” – notwithstanding that there are 14 or so similar Blacklock’s
cases against the Government involving similar issues that were awaiting reasoned
rulings from the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal and maybe the SCC
- Ignores key aspects of the lengthy procedural history below, in which Blacklock’s discontinued its copyright infringement claims and the AGC’s procedurally brilliant (“Never On A Sunday”) summary judgment counterclaim motion was blessed by the Federal Court despite Blacklock’s objection
- Technically gives Blacklock’s a win on appeal –
but it’s a classic pyrrhic victory
- Leaves the door open for Blacklock’s to continue the uncertainty and likely futility of its lengthy losing litany of litigation.
Justice Roy’s
judgment below is full of much careful fact finding and legal reasoning. Even
if it is now “obiter dicta”, it could still be very useful for the Government if
Blacklock’s goes forward with any of its other cases against the government
where the facts and issues are similar.
Blacklock’s
will get some measure of costs as a result of the FCA ruling, although the FCA
gave no reason to overturn Justice Roy’s declaration that there should be no
costs award, which was an unexplained and unnecessary act of sympathy in favour
of Blacklock’s. Justice Roy declared below that “There is no order as to
costs”. It is unclear why or even how the FCA could now go back and award costs
below to Blacklock’s. The Government
should play hardball on the costs issue, and there are well established prescribed
“tariffs” that are far from generous. The FCA has provided no reason to depart
from these tariffs. Whatever Blacklock’s gets, it won’t be enough even to cover
this case, much less to fund future pursuit of the other outstanding cases. This
costs award will be modest, given the way the Federal Courts work. See Federal Courts
Rule 407 and Tariff B.
It will be interesting to see if the Government tries to get
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. This would be an uphill battle, since the FCA’s ruling is
really only procedural at the end of the day and confined to the peculiar
unsavoury history of this unlovely litany and may thus be of little interest to
the Supreme Court of Canada.
Hopefully, this FCA decision will effectively be not just
the beginning of the end or even the end of the beginning but will result in
the actual end of this lamentable litany of litigation losses.
HPK
Tuesday, February 24, 2026
Fair Dealing Week 2026: Online Must-See Events for February 25, 2026
(University of Alberta)
Once again, it’s Fair Dealing week. Here are a couple of worthwhile Canadian online events for February 25, 2026:
· Peter
K. Yu at 1 PM ET presented by CARL: Webinar: User Rights in the Age of
Generative AI: https://www.carl-abrc.ca/event/user-rights-in-the-age-of-generative-ai/
·
David Vaver at 4 PM ET presented by CAUT: Fair
Dealing Week 2026: User rights then and now: https://www.caut.ca/event/fair-dealing-week-2026-user-rights-then-and-now/
Don’t forget to register!
BTW, speaking of fair dealing, it’s interesting to note that
Access Copyright is now getting more aggressive about pursuing
businesses for licences.
It’s worth remembering that the Supreme Court of Canada made
it very clear in the landmark CCH v. LSUC decision in 2004 that “Lawyers carrying on the business
of law for profit are conducting research within the meaning of s.
29 of the Copyright
Act.”
51 The
fair dealing exception under s. 29 is open to those who can show that their
dealings with a copyrighted work were for the purpose of research or private
study. “Research”
must be given a large and liberal interpretation in order to ensure that users’
rights are not unduly constrained. I agree with the Court of Appeal that research
is not limited to non-commercial or private contexts. The
Court of Appeal correctly noted, at para. 128, that “[r]esearch for the purpose
of advising clients, giving opinions, arguing cases, preparing briefs and
factums is nonetheless research.” Lawyers carrying on the business of law for
profit are conducting research within the meaning of s.
29 of the Copyright
Act. (highlight and emphasis added)
See: CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada,
2004 SCC 13 (CanLII), [2004] 1 SCR 339, <https://canlii.ca/t/1glp0>
Why should commercial businesses other than law that must engage
in research not be entitled to the “users’ right” of fair dealing?
BTW, for a deep dive into the significance of the CCH
decision, see the replay of the September 19 & 20, 2025 anniversary conference
here.
HPK
Monday, February 02, 2026
Does Being Interested In Whether AI Can Be An Author Make For An “Interested Person”?
CIPPIC
has filed an interesting and apparently unprecedented Federal Court application claiming standing as
an “interested person” with respect to a Canadian copyright registration for a
work entitled SURYAST in which an AI program is named as a co-author. CIPPIC says on its website:
“CIPPIC is
asking the Federal Court to expunge or rectify a copyright
registration that holds out an artificial intelligence (“AI”) program as
an author under Canadian copyright law.
At the heart of
this dispute is SURYAST, an AI-generated output, that raises fundamental
questions about authorship, originality, and AI’s place in creative endeavors.
Ankit Sahni,
an intellectual property lawyer from New Delhi,
obtained a copyright registration for SURYAST, listing himself and the AI
system as co-authors. The SURYAST output is an adaptation of a sunset
photograph, taken by Mr. Sahni, but distorted by the AI according to the style
of Vincent van Gogh’s “The Starry Night.””
Here’s the work in question entitled “SURYAST”:
(SURYAST
(Hindi word for sunset); generated with the assistance of RAGHAV) From the CIPPIC website.)
Here’s the CIPO (“Canadian
Intellectual Property Office”) copyright registration, which lists the “authors”
as “RAGHAV Artificial Intelligence Painting App” and Ankit Sahni. Mr.
Sahni is listed as the owner. The “authors” and owner are all at the same
address in India.
CIPPIC says in its application memorandum
that:
[3] The
Respondent created a “legal test case” by exploiting the automated registration
system of the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) to obtain a
copyright registration for the SURYAST output. CIPO duly issued the
registration without examination, identifying the Respondent and his AI
application as co-authors. That registration is now cited internationally as evidence
that Canada recognizes AI authorship, creating a misleading precedent that
harms the integrity of the public register and muddies the copyright status of
AI outputs in Canada.
For his part, the Respondent Ankit Sahni says in his
application memorandum:
7. The
Respondent accepts the description of the background facts as set out by the Applicant.
CIPPIC says in a letter in its record from
David Fewer, its Director and General
Counsel, to the CEO of CIPO, citing an article from an Indian law firm,
about the Canadian registration:
The
registration as it stands is improper and raises significant concerns about the
overall accuracy of the Register of Copyrights. It also sets a problematic
precedent for Canadian copyright law. It opens the door for other registrations
with AI “authors” that is contrary to the guiding principles of Canadian
copyright law and undermines the entire legislative scheme. Canada is being
pointed to internationally as a jurisdiction that “recognized Sahni’s
co-authorship with the AI tool”.
This is, with respect, neither
factually nor legally accurate. No Canadian legal precedent has been set. Copyright
registration in Canada involves no examination and no “deposit” of the work in
question. If I want to register my supposed copyright interest in a roll of
toilet paper with Donald Trump’s picture and name on it that I created with AI and
call it “Tribute to Trump”, I can do so online and waste $63. I can list myself
as author. The CIPO computer will happily process my payment and not ask any questions.
CIPO will not look at the “work” and will not even allow me to submit it. “Certificates
of registration may not be strong evidence of the subsistence of copyright or
its ownership, but that is a question of weight.” See Patterned Concrete Mississauga Inc. v. Bomanite Toronto Ltd., 2021 FC
314 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/jf8r0>
para. 13. So, it’s not hard to flush that evidence away with stronger evidence.
This shows what information
the Canadian Government requires for registration of copyright in Canada. It
says:
Do not send a copy of your work along with the
application. The Copyright Office does not review or assess works in any way,
nor does the Office check to see whether the title of your work has already
been used. Many works may appear with the same title, but if each work has been
created independently, each will have its own copyright protection.
(highlight added)
As CIPPIC points out, copyright
registration in Canada is provided “automatically”. According to CIPPIC:
“[13] The
Respondent characterizes his copyright registration efforts for the SURYAST
output as “legal test cases.” On his public LinkedIn profile, the Respondent
states he has been “working on several legal test cases, including being the
first person to have an AI system recognized as a co-author of a copyrighted
work in India and Canada.” [FN omitted]
[14] The
Respondent sought copyright registration for the SURYAST output in Canada, the United
States, and India. India’s Copyright Office initially registered the work and
recognized RAGHAV AI as a co-author, but later issued a withdrawal notice.
However, the registration remains publicly listed. The United States Copyright
Review Board rejected the application, holding that the SURYAST output lacked
sufficient originality and that an AI system cannot be an author. [FN
omitted]
The American copyright registration
system is totally different than the Canadian system. It does involve
examination and deposit. To compare it to that of Canada is like comparing Notre
Dame cathedral to the tool shed in my backyard. The Canadian system is,
frankly, an embarrassment and serves no function sufficient to justify its
continued existence. It
could have been used, by requiring registration and a
non-trivial fee for the extra 20 years, to mitigate the unfortunate Canadian decision
to extend the copyright term to life + 70 years
– but the Trudeau government unfortunately failed to do this.
The US Copyright Office also plays an
important and normally well-informed role in domestic and international policy
– even if this sometimes sparks controversy. BTW, here’s the latest report from Shira
Perlmuter, the US Register of Copyrights and Director of the U.S. Copyright
Office – who is so far successfully resisting the efforts of Trump to fire her.
The US Copyright Office has taken the position
that AI cannot be an “author”. “Because an AI system is not a human being, it
cannot be considered an “author” in collaboration with a user.” See also this commentary.
CIPPIC has filed a very lengthy
349 page record in this case complete with “expert” evidence. The
Respondent, Ankit Sahni, “accepts the description of the background facts as
set out by the Applicant.” Here is Mr. Sahni’s record.
The sometimes influential Canadian Music
Publishers Association (“CMPA”) has filed a 74 page motion to intervene and
apparently supports CIPPIC’s position that an author must be human.
Neither Mr. Sahni nor CMPA seem to have
any problem with the nature of this proceeding or the standing of CIPPIC as an
“interested person” to initiate it. Indeed, CMPA supports CIPPIC’s contention
that it is an “interested person”, which should be the existential threshold issue
in this proceeding, as I discuss below.
Frankly, one cannot help but wonder how
this case arose or to what extent it is actually adversarial in nature. If Mr.
Sahni loses, he will have something more to write about in his apparent quest
to publicize his test of various registration regimes. In the unlikely event
that anyone could ever be bothered to infringe SURYAST and Mr. Sahni decides to
sue in Canada, he could still
conceivably try to do so successfully as an author/owner who used AI as a tool.
If CIPPIC somehow “wins” in this application, in spite of the “standing” issue
discussed below, this registration might
possibly be struck – but the ruling could and perhaps should be quite narrow
and procedural and provide no useful precedential guidance.
If and when Mr. Sahni sues someone in a
Canadian court for infringing SURYAST, then CIPPIC could then apply to
intervene, as it has done in many other cases.
“Interested Person”
CIPPIC may risk the displeasure of the Federal
Court by claiming to be an “interested person” in this case. The only possible
basis for CIPPIC’s application is that it is “interested person” within
the meaning of s. 57(4) of the Copyright Act. Frankly, its arguments are
unconvincing. If CIPPIC is an “interested person” in this instance, so too are
countless Canadians and others who may, though lacking CIPPIC’s experience, have
well informed views about AI and copyright law. Being an “interested person” is
not the same thing as being an intervener, a role in which CIPPIC is
indeed experienced – and which requires leave of the Court in any given case.
Being an “interested person” is not the same thing as finding an issue to be
interesting, however interesting and even important it might be.
S. 57(4) of the Copyright Act
states that:
57(4) The
Federal Court may, on application of the Registrar of Copyrights or of any interested person,
order the rectification of the Register of Copyrights by
(a) the
making of any entry wrongly omitted to be made in the Register,
(b) the
expunging of any entry wrongly made in or remaining on the Register, or
(c) the
correction of any error or defect in the Register,
and any rectification of the Register
under this subsection shall be retroactive from such date as the Court may
order.
(highlight and
emphasis added)
It would seem quite questionable that
CIPPIC is an “interested person”. The case law under s. 57(4) suggests that
an “interested person" must be an author, owner, someone disputing or
updating ownership, plaintiff, defendant, assignee, licensee, or someone
claiming to be any of the foregoing, etc. This case law is not to be found in
CIPPIC’s Memorandum. Mere curiosity or intellectual interest is arguably far
from sufficient. That kind of interest is best pursued in academic journals,
blogs, or lobbying corridors. There is an old proverb about how “curiosity killed the cat”.
It would seem that CIPPIC, Mr. Sahni,
and now the CMPA are all eager to bring a potentially very complicated test
case to the Federal Court – even though there is no “live dispute” between the parties involving a
potential finding of liability, or any basic factual dispute. It is interesting
that the records do not indicate that there was any cross-examination on the
various affidavits.
Let me be blunt. IMHO, This is not an
appropriate case to take to the Federal Court. The Court may not be willing to
spend a lot of time and resources in these circumstances, even if the parties
and intervener(s) are willing to expend their resources in this way. CIPPIC is not defending anyone who has been sued.
The Supreme Court of Canada has made it crystal clear that courts should not be
granting declaratory judgments or advisory opinions in copyright cases where
there is no actual “live dispute”:
But the usefulness of guidelines in
theory does not provide
the Court with a sound basis for entertaining declaratory relief without a live
dispute between the parties or when those whose rights are at stake
are not privy to the proceedings.
(highlight and
emphasis added)
See York University v. Canadian Copyright
Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), 2021 SCC
32 (CanLII),
[2021] 2 SCR 734, para. 86. Certainly,
the long running confrontation between Access Copyright and York University
that led to this landmark decision began as a very real “dispute” with
countless millions of dollars actually at stake for York and other educational
institutions in stark comparison to the theoretical debate between CIPPIC and
Mr. Sahni. But since the tariff in question was ultimately held to be “not
mandatory”, there was no longer any actual “live dispute" between the
parties. Accordingly, and thankfully, the Court declined to rule on the very
problematic guidelines upon which York tried to rely. BTW, I’m very proud that
my arguments on behalf of CARL and Prof. Ariel Katz’s arguments were
instrumental in carrying the day on the “mandatory” issue when the case got to
the SCC.
The issue of whether a public interest
entity has standing to ask the courts to rule in the absence of an actual live
dispute or as other than a directly affected person in an actual case has been
and continues to be important, and probably always will be. CIPPIC’s relies on Canada
(Attorney General) v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence
Society, 2012 SCC 45 (CanLII), [2012] 2 SCR 524, <https://canlii.ca/t/fss7s>.
However, CIPPIC can hardly compare its interest here to that of the organization
representing the sex workers whose safety and business interests were obviously
at stake in that litigation but who were unwilling themselves to bring a challenge
forward in their own names. See also Borowski
v. Canada (Attorney General), 1989 CanLII 123 (SCC),
[1989] 1 SCR 342.
CIPPIC boldly submits it has that it
has standing as an “interested person”:
[39] No private
party is directly interested in challenging the SURYAST output registration.
The work does not infringe the rights of any identifiable person or entity.
There is no private squabble over copyright ownership. This is not a defect in
CIPPIC’s application, but a reason why CIPPIC merits public interest standing.
The Respondent’s registration raises a systemic question about the validity of
non-human authorship under Canadian law and the subsistence of copyright in AI
generated outputs. These questions will go unaddressed unless this Court allows
a party like CIPPIC to bring them forward.
CIPPIC’s reliance on Rizzo &
Rizzo Shoes Ltd (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27, <https://canlii.ca/t/1fqwt>
(SCC) to expand the meaning of “interested person” is anything but persuasive.
That case is too frequently cited as a last resort when no better argument or
authority regarding statutory interpretation is available.
There’s lots of other case law about
public interest standing – and it’s a very live issue even as we speak in the
SCC, i.e. the recently heard Democracy Watch v. AGC case in which
judgment is pending. It’s obvious that
the courts can and must exercise some serious triage on when and how
non-parties can initiate litigation. Canadian courts are notoriously backlogged
with urgent real litigation while resources, especially judicial resources, are
and are likely to remain limited and even inadequate overall.
BTW, I’m not the only one to raise the
issue of whether CIPPIC has “standing” here. See this comment from the prominent firm of Lenczner Slaght.
Other Issues
CIPPIC is seeking:
an Order:
i. pursuant to
paragraph 57(4)(b) of the Copyright Act, to rectify the Register of Copyrights by expunging the
Registration dated December 1, 2021, in connection with the SURYAST output
(Canadian Copyright Registration Number 1188619); or
ii. in the alternative, pursuant to
paragraph 57(4)(c) of the Copyright Act, to rectify the Register of Copyrights by removing “RAGHAV
Artificial Intelligence Painting App” from the SURYAST Registration as a
co-author;
(highlight
added)
For his part, Mr. Sahni, through his
counsel from a very reputable IP firm, makes some frankly bizarre assertions
such as:
25. While the
Court may opt to exercise its discretion, the Registrar is entitled to an appropriate degree of
deference. (FN omitted)
26. The Registrar has determined that rigorous examination of
applications for registration is unnecessary. Unlike other intellectual
property such as patents and trademarks, copyright law is sui generis.
(highlight
added)
There no longer appears to even be an
actual “Registrar of Copyrights”, although I recall that there once was such a
person. The term still does appear in the Copyright Act. In any case, the
“Registrar” (or whoever or whatever) is not entitled to any deference because nothing
was done or decided whatsoever other than that the CIPO computer automatically accepted
Mr. Sahni’s $63 and automatically issue a certificate in accordance with an essentially useless registration regime
that is predicated upon NO examination and NO deposit.
Mr. Sahni’s counsel states:
28. The simple purpose of copyright registration is to provide
official proof of ownership for creative works. Indeed, in Canada, copyright registration
automatically exists upon creation. Registration simply provides a legal
certificate to be held by the owner to protect against infringer.
(highlight
added)
The $63 certificate provides nothing
more than minimal and evidence pursuant to s. 53 of the Copyright Act
that can easily be challenged and overcome in litigation, depending on the
facts. That is hardly “official proof of
ownership”. It is simply incorrect to state that “copyright registration
automatically exists upon creation.” Obviously, registration does not happen
“automatically”. Someone must create an
account with CIPO, provide minimal information, and – above all – pay $63 (or
$81 if done in writing).
Sahni’s memorandum does contain some
interesting observations about modern art created by throwing paint on a
canvas, etc. This is NOT the kind of thing that should take the Court’s time in
this way.
AI does not create works all by itself,
although that may soon happen or even be happening. That is not alleged in this
case. Mr. Sahni had to prompt the machine, even if only with some minimal
parameters. The Supreme Court of Canada has made it quite clear that “skill and
judgment” are required for the subsistence of copyright in Canada. It may well
be that AI can be used by human authors to assist in the production of works
protected by copyright. Various “machines” and technology have been used since the
advent of Gutenberg’s printing press in 1440 and particularly in the last two
centuries to enable the production and reproduction of copyrighted works
ranging from books to photographs to films to musical compositions to
performances. AI is obviously a new and very promising and potent tool.
If and when Mr. Sahni should ever sue
someone in Canada for infringing SURYAST, maybe we will find out whether the
work actually qualifies for copyright and whether even he qualifies as the
author. He won’t need to join the AI
program as a co-author - unless he wants to generate more publicity and potentially
unnecessarily spend a lot of his and others’, including the Court’s, time.
Is the Issue Really So Clear?
The ultimate issue that CIPPIC has
exposed is whether AI can be an “author” for copyright purposes. One is tempted
to categorically deny such a possibility and to look somehow for legal
confirmation. However, remember the old “infinite monkey theorem” which
“states that a monkey hitting keys independently and
at random on a typewriter keyboard for
an infinite amount of time will almost surely type any
given text, including the complete works of William Shakespeare”.
Maybe the issue isn’t as simple and obvious as it seems. Given
the appalling and often minimalist state of much of today’s visual and musical
production, for example, I have no doubt that AI programs, left to their own
machinations, can produce much better stuff than we often see in museums or
hear on Spotify. What if AI is able to generate, without much or even any
further human involvement, more Mona Lisa style paintings, more Shakespeare
style plays, and more Mozart style symphonies – all of which
might well be quite new and different than anything before, technically and
qualitatively excellent, and very “creative”?
Perhaps the issue involves not only whether AI can be a an
“author” in the co-author sense, as in this application, but an author all by
itself without any specific human prompting or further involvement. What do
“author” and “creative” really mean anymore?
Is it maybe even timely and necessary to revisit the meaning
of “original” in copyright law? Can something be “original” and maybe even
magnificently so without human authorship? Canada’s iconic CCH v. LSUC decision defined “original” as follows:
25 For
these reasons, I conclude that an “original” work under the Copyright Act is one
that originates from an author and is not copied from another
work. That alone, however, is not sufficient to find that something
is original. In addition, an original work must be the
product of an author’s exercise of skill and judgment. The exercise of
skill and judgment required to produce the work must not be so trivial that it
could be characterized as a purely mechanical exercise. While creative works
will by definition be “original” and covered by copyright, creativity is not
required to make a work “original”.
See “The Evolution of Originality in Canadian Copyright Law:
Authorship, Reward and the Public Interest” Carys J. Craig,
2005. Perhaps “the times, they are a-changin”…?
This is fascinating
and interesting stuff – but I’m skeptical that it should be justiciable
as framed in this application which is focussed on one isolated registration in
Canada’s problematic copyright registry involving a work that is not the
subject of any “live dispute”. If this case somehow goes forward, it may and
perhaps should be more about standing and procedure than about the potentially
very complex issues of authorship, originality, creativity, etc.
Conclusion
CIPPIC has done some very good work
over the years. Indeed, I was proud to have been CIPPIC’s pro bono external lead
counsel on its first and possibly most important court case where we successfully
and influentially intervened to protect people’s privacy rights in the face of
mass music industry piracy litigation. See: BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe
(F.C.A.), 2005 FCA 193 (CanLII), [2005] 4 FCR 81, <https://canlii.ca/t/1kx1k>. CIPPIC has also intervened successfully in other
important cases, e.g. involving default judgments in more recent mass piracy litigation,
reverse class actions, and lately preserving fair dealing rights in the face of
a dubious TPM circumvention allegation (appeal pending).
This is, frankly IMHO, a needlessly
risky initiative for CIPPIC in the sometimes rather harsh real world of the Canadian
Federal Court. It is clear that much of the work was done by students. Student
involvement in actual litigation is commendable and should be encouraged in the
right circumstances. But perhaps this case should have been framed as a law
school moot court exercise based upon a hypothetical fact situation – rather
than an actual Federal Court application that could consume a lot of precious
court time potentially only to be dismissed for lack of standing and/or absence
of an actual “live dispute” involving actual parties. That would conceivably be
a big disappointment for the students involved.
For whatever reason, this case seems to
be going nowhere according to the docket. A Requisition for
Hearing was filed on July 28, 2025 but nothing appears to have happened since
then. CMPA’s application to intervene has not been decided. Might this be
because the Court perhaps has some concerns about this application? If it does
somehow proceed, and there is no further intervention to challenge the basis of
the proceeding, including CIPPIC’s assertion of standing, it will be
interesting to see if a sceptical judge might do so sua sponte at some
point.
At the end of the day, CIPPIC has admittedly identified an
interesting issue. But this proceeding is NOT the best, maybe not even a viable
way to resolve the issue, and possibly very risky for CIPPIC. It The issue of
whether AI can be an “author”, as opposed to being yet another tool used by
actual human authors, may get resolved one day in Canada through actual
adversarial copyright infringement litigation. If the issue is sufficiently
serious and urgent, which is currently far from clear, then the Government could
legislate. As for registration of a non-human as an “author”, the Government
could presumably deal with this issue by regulation. If and when the Government
chooses to engage in significant broad revision of the Copyright Act, or
even in updating regulations under that legislation, this is an issue that
might well be addressed at that time.
And finally, for those interested in
this issue in whatever way, stay tuned for what is happening in the USA where
the Thaler case may be heard in the US Supreme Court if certiorari is
granted. Here’s the US Government’s recent brief
on “Whether the court of appeals correctly upheld the Copyright Office’s
refusal to register a claim to copyright in an image for which no human author
had been identified.” Here’s the docket in
the Thaler case to date. Here’s the decision from the DC
Court of Appeals.
BTW, the University of Ottawa Faculty
of Law is once again looking for a new Director of CIPPIC.
HPK
(highlight and emphasis added)
(as usual, not legal advice)
Monday, January 05, 2026
The Proposed Artist’s Resale Right – A Bad Solution in Search of a Problem?
(Un-credited
soapstone sculpture for sale by Canada House Gallery)
The recent federal government budget proposed an artist’s
resale right (“ARR”) in its 2024 Budget. The details are unknown, and there was
no mention of it in the budget implementation legislation Bill C-15 tabled on
November 4, 2025.
The good news about this proposal is that it is, so far, the
ONLY visible copyright arrow in this government’s current quiver. For the time
being, we have been spared any disastrous proposals to cut back on fair
dealing, to make Copyright Board tariffs mandatory, or other potentially
dangerous proposals – despite the best efforts of the usual lobbyists and
collective madness.
Here’s what Budget 2025 had to say:
Protecting Artists’ and
Creators’ Copyrights
Artists, particularly visual
artists, are great contributors to Canada’s cultural scene and among the lowest
income earners in Canada despite their significant cultural contributions. An
Artist’s Resale Right provides the creators of original visual artwork with a
royalty whenever their work is resold through an eligible sale, providing an
additional income stream.
In Budget 2025, the government
announces its intent to amend the Copyright Act to create an Artist’s Resale
Right in Canada, ensuring Canadian visual artists benefit from future sales of
their work.
…
Protecting Artists’ and
Creators’ Copyrights
Amendments to the Copyright
Act to establish an artist's resale right in Canada.
This measure is expected to
benefit visual artists in Canada, particularly Indigenous visual artists, who make up a higher
proportion of visual artists (4.1 per cent) relative to other artforms (3.1 per
cent). In 2015 visual
artists had a median income of $20,000 compared to $41,000 for cultural workers
and $43,500 for all workers.
(highlight added)
BTW, these numbers are potentially very misleading. Who and
what is an “artist”? Who and what is a “cultural worker”? Does this include
amateurs who cannot even give their stuff away at flea markets? We have similar
reliability problems for the “starving artist myth” as applied to writers and
musicians. There are no accreditation standards for these professions. In many
cases, the “starving artist” may be “starving” because, for whatever reason,
nobody wants to pay them. There is no guaranteed annual income for every
self-proclaimed artist, writer, musician, actor etc. in Canada – or anywhere
for that matter. As a former professional musician and as a writer in the eyes
of Access Copyright, I ought to know.
But does the ARR make any sense on its own? The answer would
seem to be clearly negative. As suggested by others over the years, it would
likely:
- Be unconstitutional since it deals with resale rights in tangible objects, such as paintings and sculptures. It has nothing to do with production, reproduction, or performance which have been the essence of “copyright” as we know it. This new scheme will arguably be about personal property and civil rights, which is provincial jurisdiction in Canada. See this by Ariel Katz and Guy Rub and this essay by Guy Rub. See also Michael Geist’s Podcast #253 featuring Guy Rub.
- Benefit only older, successful, and/or mainly dead artists (i.e. their estates)
- Benefit unproductive collectives
- Throw a potential lifeline to the Copyright Board, the need for which (at least in its current bloated form) is becoming increasingly questionable as it devolves more quickly and clearly into a rubber stamp with very rare engagement on any “inaugural” or complicated new matters
- Pander to unrealistic expectations of Indigenous artists created by opportunistic lobbyists and politicians
- Significantly impair the art auction and even the routine commercial art gallery market in Canada
- Drive art resale underground and/or to the USA, where an ARR does not exist and is extremely unlikely in the foreseeable future
- Potentially collide with and/or complicate the already problematic regime under the Cultural Property Export and Import Act, RSC 1985, c C-51,
- Do nothing to solve the problem that darkens the Canadian art market of fake and counterfeit Indigenous art. In fact, it may worsen the problem by driving more sales underground or out of sight, for example into flea markets and other countries.
Above all, any new “right” that unnecessarily adds friction,
intermediaries, and regulation is likely to be economically inefficient and
drain money from those that most deserve it. It will effectively be a
particularly inefficient “tax” on art – which will mostly if not totally
benefit meddlesome middlemen and collectives and lessen the returns to
galleries and, above all, artists themselves. Excessive copyright rights have
long been seen as a “tax”, e.g. by Lord Macauly in 1841.
In other words, it could be an unnecessary and unworkable
solution in search of a non-existent problem. It would, of course, benefit CARFAC, the organization that is aggressively endorsing
it and the collective it is touting to administer
it. There has been lobbying by Canadian Artists’ Representation / Le Front des artistes
canadiens, which receives substantial government
funding.
CARFAC us proposing that:
·
that it applies to secondary sales of
original artworks for the lifetime of the artist, and their estates
covered under the term of copyright;
·
that the rate paid to rightsholders is 5%;
·
that it applies to works sold in the
secondary market for at least $1,000;
·
that the art market agent and seller of the
artwork are jointly responsible for the payment of the royalty; and
·
that royalties be managed and paid through
the copyright management organization, CARCC, currently operating under the
business name of Copyright Visual Arts – Droits d’auteur Arts visuels.
If there is concern in the Indigenous community about
exploitation of working artists, there should be further consideration and
exploitation of the certification mark regime
that has long been in existence under the Canadian Trademarks Act. A certification
mark is like a “seal of approval” that
the goods and services covered meet a defined standard of quality and
authenticity. This would help to ensure that that the sculptures, paintings, or
whatever actually come from the identified community and are not factory
produced fakes from elsewhere.
The use of “official” marks under the Trademarks
Act may be possible where the test
to evaluate public authority status can be met, i.e.:
The two-part test is
made up of the following elements:
·
a significant degree of control must be
exercised by the appropriate government over the activities of the body; and
·
the activities of the body must benefit the
public.
Political Implications
The Liberals will either have a minority government or a
bare majority until the next election. The urgency of other issues, not least
of which is CUSMA which will likely implicate intellectual property and
copyright, may keep the ARR from urgently being top of mind for Mark Carney and
the new Heritage Minister, Marc Miller (who is an Anglophone from Quebec with
impressively promising credentials). Without a
majority, things can get stuck very easily in
Committee hearings. Whatever can be said about the Conservatives, if they somehow regain a majority or assert
themselves in committee, they have sometimes shown more wisdom than the
Liberals when it comes to copyright legislation and are less likely to pander
to the culture sirens from Quebec and the Toronto collectives.
HPK

