Showing posts with label retroactive tariff. Show all posts
Showing posts with label retroactive tariff. Show all posts

Sunday, April 14, 2019

Access Copyright Proposed Tariffs: Is the Copyright Board Turning Over New Leaves?


On March 6, 2019 the Copyright Board appears to have turned over one new leaf by asking for comments more than three years after the close of the hearing from “affected persons” on the “feasibility and clarity of the terms of the tariff” with respect to Access Copyright’s proposed tariffs for the Post-Secondary Educational (“PSE”) Institutions.  I reported on this here. Those entitled to comment potentially included lots of people and institutions that may have withdrawn from this nearly nine-year-old saga or may even have never engaged. In the past, the Board has limited acceptance of comments to a short window following the close of the oral hearing.

The invitation resulted in 11 submissions, which have conveniently been made available here from the Board itself – a helpful and timely development and another new leaf in itself. (Publishing filed court and tribunal public documents is a crucial component of access to justice). From the users’ point of view, these submissions feature a comforting degree of consistency and, at the same time, a considerable degree of independent analysis and approach.

There are some common themes throughout most of these submissions. These are as follows:
1.     The tariffs should not be mandatory and should expressly so state. As clearly stated by CARL, for example (to which I was pleased to provide a helping hand):
Our first comment is that there should be text at the outset of both drafts indicating that use of the tariff is voluntary. This flows from the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. SODRAC 2003 Inc. The proposed tariffs should therefore clearly state that, while Access Copyright cannot demand higher royalties or more onerous terms and conditions than those approved by the Board, the duty to pay such royalties and comply with the related terms and conditions will only apply to users who have paid or have offered to pay the royalties under such a tariff. (Footnote omitted)

2.     A number of the submissions pointed out the practical and even the legal difficulties with a retroactive tariff that reaches back almost a decade. How are institutions supposed to reconstruct records of what material they used so long ago? How are institutions supposed to known what was in Access Copyright’s repertoire at the time? Even now, that repertoire database, if it even exists, is not available to users. Some institutions pointed explicitly to the potential invalidity of retroactive tariffs in light of the venerable 1954  Maple Leaf Broadcasting v. Composers, Authors and Publishers Association of Canada Ltd., [1954] SCR 624 (“Maple Leaf”)  decision from the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”). That decision was concerned with a tariff on radio stations that was retroactive by less than three months and the SCC – with some rather explicit reluctance – permitted it as a “practical necessity” but stated clearly that it was the "implied duty" of the Board to proceed with "all possible expedition" in cases where tariffs may have a retroactive effect. In the recent CBC v. SODRAC 2015 SCC 57 case in the SCC, I cited this same Maple Leaf case in the factum prepared along with Prof. Ariel Katz and Prof. David Lametti (as he then was). There was considerable interest during the oral argument in the retroactivity issue and the SCC commented on it very explicitly in this unusual footnote – which may be seen as a warning signal to collectives and an invitation to users seeking judicial review of retroactive tariffs:
[2] During the hearing before this Court, counsel for the interveners the Centre for Intellectual Property Policy and Ariel Katz briefly raised concerns regarding the Board’s power to issue retroactively binding decisions in general. That issue was not squarely before this Court in this case, and I do not purport to decide broader questions concerning the legitimacy of or limits on the Board’s power to issue retroactive decisions here.

CARL also mentioned the Board’s own 2008 decision in SOCAN 22.B to 22.G Tariffs wherein the Board found that it would be “highly disruptive, and therefore ipso facto unfair”  to certify a tariff that, among other considerations, was for a period (1996 to 2006) that is long past.“ This decision was upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal in Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Bell Canada, 2010 FCA 139 at paras. 20 and 26, a case which I argued. I’ve discussed the Maple Leaf case before.

Clearly, the Board has not proceeded “with all possible expedition” in this nine-year-old proceeding and it would seem inconceivable that there could be any reasonable basis to justify a nine-year retroactive tariff as a “practical necessity”. The University of Toronto has wisely submitted that “The effect of the extreme delay in the present case raises a series of issues that merit full, transparent and detailed review, with input from any affected party, before a final decision regarding the tariffs is made.”  In light of the case law, any retroactivity in this instance may be vulnerable.

There are a number of possible twists and turns ahead on both the “mandatory” and “retroactive” issues. We should get some guidance on the “mandatory” issue in the next weeks or months from the Federal Court of Appeal in the appeal of the York University case, where the issue loomed large, although it was not addressed as fully as it would have been if my client CARL had been allowed to intervene. In any event, this “mandatory” issue may very likely end up in the SCC, unless Parliament clarifies the law as enunciated by the SCC as I have suggested to the INDU Committee.

3.     A number of institutions also raised other important points, such as:
a.      The need for Access Copyright to make its repertoire database accessible online;
b.     The need to point out that fair dealing may permit copying in excess of any bright line set out in the tariff language;
c.      The possible inclusion of a transactional license mechanism;
d.     The overbroad definition of “copy” which goes beyond the legislation, for example by including linking or display; and,
e.      The overreaching and intrusive records and reporting provisions.

Overall, these 11 submissions raise some existentially important points in the terms of the “feasibility” of these tariffs. If the Board intends to approve a tariff that can survive judicial review and/or be enforceable, it may need to turn over even more new leaves, as it were. Maybe that will involve rediscovering the Maple Leaf, as in the landmark 1954 SCC Maple Leaf decision. And following the 2015 SCC decision in CBC v. SODRAC – which would indicate that, if a tariff provided pursuant the voluntary “arbitration” regime is not mandatory, then a fortiori, the use of the general regime cannot result in a tariff that is mandatory as against unwilling institutional users who clear their copyright obligations more efficiently in other ways. How can it be that such an institution, which may have inadvertently made even only a single copy of single work in Access Copyright’s repertoire in manner that might amount to technical infringement, be liable for millions of dollars for maybe tens of thousands of FTEs for the term of the tariff?  And here’s another potentially crucial issue.  If the current proposed tariffs start to involve constitutional issues, as the redoubtable Prof. Katz suggests in his submission, –  given that education is a provincial power – we could see some interesting arguments about a concept  much beloved by the SCC known as the “living tree”.

Enough arborist allusions. No doubt because spring is so late this year. Can’t wait for it and all the little maple saplings in my back yard…

And at the risk of reopening Canada’s national anthem debate, I include a wonderful rendition of “The Maple Leaf Forever More” by the legendary and world-renowned Canadian tenor Edward Johnson (1878 – 1959) – who became the manager of the Metropolitan Opera in New York and whose name is on the Faculty of Music building at U of T, where I played at the opening ceremony and spent many years.

HPK


Thursday, November 26, 2015

SCC Ruling in CBC v SODRAC: Per Rothstein J.: “I find that licences fixed by the Board do not have mandatory binding force over a user…”

(Wikimedia)

The Supreme Court of Canada issued an immensely important ruling today in the case of Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. SODRAC 2003 Inc., 2015 SCC 57 , which was mostly about technological neutrality, “ephemeral rights” and “incidental copies” in the broadcasting realm.  However, while others are attempting to unpack the implications of this ruling on technological neutrality, broadcasting, etc., there are about a dozen paragraphs of potentially very great interest and significance to those, such as educators, who are concerned with even broader issues about whether tariffs can be “mandatory” and whether a collective or the Board can “impose” a licence or royalty fees on an unwilling user, and even whether and to what extent tariffs can be retroactive. I should disclose that I was the Counsel for the Centre for Intellectual Property Policy of McGill University (headed by Prof. David Lametti, now David Lametti, M.P.) and Prof. Ariel Katz of the University of Toronto, both of whom appeared with me at the hearing. Here is a link to our factum, which is closely reflected in these paragraphs from the 7-2 majority reasons by Rothstein J., who has now retired from the Court:

***************
(2)  The Board May Not Compel a User to Agree to the Terms of a Licence Against the Will of the User
(101)      CBC argues that, while the Board may fix the royalties to be paid under the statutory licensing procedure created by s. 70.2 of the Copyright Act, the Board may not set the other terms or structure of that licence. Specifically, CBC takes issue with the Board’s decision to impose an interim licence on a blanket basis, such that CBC pays for access to the entire SODRAC repertoire, rather than on CBC’s preferred transactional basis, whereby CBC would pay only whenever it actually used a work from the SODRAC repertoire. A blanket licence grants access to SODRAC’s entire repertoire for its duration, and thus reduces CBC’s ability to control its licensing costs. Under a transactional licence, by contrast, CBC may choose in any given situation whether it wishes to licence a particular work or forego making use of SODRAC music. CBC argues that if the collective organization and the user disagree over the model a licence is to take — blanket or transactional — the Board lacks the power to compel the execution of a licence.
(102)      SODRAC counters that the Board has the power to issue licences in either blanket or transactional form, and should have this power in all proceedings under s. 70.2. To hold otherwise, it argues, would be “to make the Board’s remedial jurisdiction under section 70.2 dependent upon the consent of a user, [and] would be at odds with its mandate to resolve disputes”: R.F., at para. 133.
(103)      Though CBC first raised this issue in the context of the Board’s Interim Licence Decision, the dispute relates generally to the Board’s power to structure licences, whether interim or not: Does the Board’s power to set the terms of a licence include the power to bind the parties to those terms?
(104)      I do not read the Copyright Act to necessitate that decisions made pursuant to the Board’s licence-setting proceedings under s. 70.2 have a binding effect against users. Section 70.2 itself provides that where a collective organization and a user cannot agree on the terms of a licence, either party may apply to the Board to “fix the royalties and their related terms and conditions”: Copyright Act, s. 70.2(1). This grant of power speaks of the Board’s authority to set down in writing a set of terms that, in its opinion, represent a fair deal to licence the use of the works at issue. It says nothing, however, about whether these terms are to be binding against the user.
(105)      The statutory context supports the conclusion that licences crafted pursuant to s. 70.2 proceedings are not automatically binding on users. Section 70.4 of the Act provides:
70.4 Where any royalties are fixed for a period pursuant to subsection 70.2(2), the person concerned may, during the period, subject to the related terms and conditions fixed by the Board and to the terms and conditions set out in the scheme and on paying or offering to pay the royalties, do the act with respect to which the royalties and their related terms and conditions are fixed and the collective society may, without prejudice to any other remedies available to it, collect the royalties or, in default of their payment, recover them in a court of competent jurisdiction.
(106)      This provision makes it clear that a user whose copying activities were the subject of a s. 70.2 proceeding may avail itself of the terms and conditions established by the Board as a way to gain authorization to engage in the activity contemplated in the Board proceeding. The language of s. 70.4 does not, of its own force, bind the user to the terms and conditions of the licence.
(107)      The conclusion that Board licences established pursuant to s. 70.2 are not binding on users comports with the more general legal principle that “no pecuniary burden can be imposed upon the subjects of this country, by whatever name it may be called, whether tax, due, rate or toll, except upon clear and distinct legal authority”: Gosling v. Veley (1850), 12 Q.B. 328, 116 E.R. 891, at p. 407, as approved and adopted in Ontario English Catholic Teachers’ Assn. v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 15, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 470, at para. 77, and Attorney-General v. Wilts United Dairies, Ltd. (1921), 37 T.L.R. 884 (C.A.), at p. 885. To bind a user to a licence would be to make it liable according to its terms and conditions should it engage in the covered activity. In the absence of clear and distinct legal authority showing that this was Parliament’s intent, the burdens of a licence should not be imposed on a user who does not consent to be bound by its terms.
(108)      SODRAC’s framing of the issue is not entirely wrong: the Board does have the power under s. 70.2 to “fix the royalties and their related terms and conditions”. That is, the Board may decide upon a fair royalty to be paid should the user decide to engage in the activity at issue under the terms of a licence. However, this power does not contain within it the power to force these terms on a user who, having reviewed the terms, decided that engaging in licensed copying is not the way to proceed. Of course, should the user then engage in unauthorized copying regardless, it will remain liable for infringement. But it will not be liable as a licensee unless it affirmatively assumes the benefits and burdens of the licence.
(109)      The matter is complicated considerably by the fact that the Board’s statutory licence decisions have, in recent years, taken on an increasingly retroactive character. CBC’s statutory licence in this case provides an example: the licence covers the period from November 2008 to March 2012, but the Board’s final decision was issued on November 2, 2012, after the term of the licence had expired. In situations like these, the Board may issue interim licences that seek to fill the legal vacuum before the final decision is ready, but this leaves a user to operate based on assumptions about how their ultimate liability for actions taken during the interim period will be evaluated.
(110)      Should a user engage in copying activity under an interim licence, and then find itself presented with a final licence whose terms it would not voluntarily assume, the user is left in a difficult position: accept the terms of an undesirable licence, or decline the licence and retroactively delegitimize the covered activity engaged in during the interim period, risking an infringement suit. This dilemma may mean that a user who operates under an interim licence has no realistic choice but to assume the terms of the final licence.
(111)      While I find this possibility troubling, I do not find that this result would detract from the more general proposition that there is no legal basis on which to hold users to the terms of a licence without their assent. The licence is not de jure binding against users, even if the particulars of a specific proceeding, and a user’s decision to engage in covered activity during an interim period, may mean that the user does not de facto have a realistic choice to decline the licence.[1]
(112)      I conclude that the statutory licensing scheme does not contemplate that licences fixed by the Board pursuant to s. 70.2 should have a mandatory binding effect against users. However, this case does not require this Court to decide whether the same is true of collective organizations. It may be that the statutory scheme’s focus on regulating the actions of collective organizations, and the case law’s focus on ensuring that such organizations do not devolve into “instruments of oppression and extortion” (Vigneux v. Canadian Performing Right Society Ltd., [1943] S.C.R. 348, at p. 356, per Duff J., quoting Hanfstaengl v. Empire Palace, [1894] 3 Ch. 109, at p. 128) would justify finding that the Board does have the power to bind collective organizations to a licence based on the user’s preferred model — transactional or blanket — on terms that the Board finds fair in view of that model. However, this issue was not argued in this case.
(113)        I find that licences fixed by the Board do not have mandatory binding force over a user; the Board has the statutory authority to fix the terms of licences pursuant to s. 70.2, but a user retains the ability to decide whether to become a licensee and operate pursuant to that licence, or to decline.
(highlight added)




[1] During the hearing before this Court, counsel for the interveners the Centre for Intellectual Property Policy and Ariel Katz briefly raised concerns regarding the Board’s power to issue retroactively binding decisions in general. That issue was not squarely before this Court in this case, and I do not purport to decide broader questions concerning the legitimacy of or limits on the Board’s power to issue retroactive decisions here.


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HPK

Monday, June 01, 2015

Do We Finally Have a Canadian Re:Sound Copyright “Fitness Tariff” After 8 Years? “Are We There Yet”?



The Copyright Board on March 27, 2015 issued a ruling on Re:Sound’s fitness tariff 6.B that may possibly bring some closure, at least to the parties directly involved, to a file that is now about eight [8] years old. However, unlike the more recent decision re Access Copyright’s Provincial and Territorial tariff concerning which I’ve just written, this fitness tariff case has really no clear conclusion, since the public, incredibly, after 8 years, still doesn’t even know how much it is worth overall. And the Board has suggested that we may need to start over again at the next round of hearings due to the “unreliable” expert evidence proffered at the first round.

This was a typical Board hearing in many ways, and it shows many aspects of why these things can take so long and cost so much. Here’s the timeline:

  • Tariff is filed June 2, 2007
  • Board Hearing April 27 to May 11, 2010
  • Board Decision July 6, 2012
  • Judicial Review Application Filed August 7, 2012
  • Hearing by Federal Court of  Appeal (“FCA”) November 19, 2013 
  •  Decision by Federal Court of Appeal February 24, 2014
  • Parties File Settlement March 21, 2014 
  •  On April 17, 2014 the Board ruled that:
Those parts of Re:Sound Tariff No. 6.B (Use of Recorded Music to Accompany Physical Activities) that were set aside on February 24, 2014 in Re:Sound v Fitness Industry Council of Canada et al. (2014 FCA 48) are reinstated on an interim basis effective as of January 1, 2008 and until the Board issues a further interim decision or a final decision.
  • Board approves settlement agreement with minor adjustment March 27, 2015

That is almost 8 years from the beginning to the inconclusive end. True, this one did involve an unusually great amount of money – or at least Re:Sound tried to make that be the case. Re:Sound was seeking roughly $86 million per year” from  fitness facility operators, etc. The objectors proposed a formula that would have yielded about $3 million a year. That’s a big discrepancy.  Revenues from fitness clubs are about $2 billion a year. Lots of zeros sometimes seem to have a way of making things very complicated and protracted at the Copyright Board. Although this was an “inaugural” (first instance) tariff for Re:Sound, SOCAN has had a “fitness” tariff for years and the issues should not have been all that complicated, or so one would have thought.

To remind readers, SOCAN is the collective for composers, authors and music publishers. Re:Sound (formerly NRCC) represents performers and sound recording producers. Readers may also recall that it was Re:Sound that tried – not surprisingly unsuccessfully – to convince the Supreme Court of Canada that the word “excludes” actually means “includes”, after having not surprisingly failed to do so before the Board and the Federal Court of Appeal.

But even after all of this, and eight years later, the Board still doesn’t tell us what the final tariff will actually cost Canadian fitness fans in the end. One would think that such information would be useful if not indispensable. The Board sometimes estimates the overall cost of its tariffs. It seems to me that it once did so regularly, and it did so indeed in the recent Access Copyright decision re Provincial and Territorial Governments.

Indeed, it should arguably be required to do so in every case, given the public interest aspect of tariff setting. The regulations I have long argued for should spell this out. If the Board doesn’t know with reasonable certainty what the overall cost of a tariff will be, it arguably should not be certifying the tariff. Moreover, all collectives with certified tariffs should be required to publish reasonably detailed information annually on receipts, costs of administration and distribution, including average and mean amounts to individual creators. Some collectives are at least somewhat forthcoming on some of these numbers – but overall, there is far from sufficient disclosure. Oddly enough, Access Copyright is actually reasonably forthcoming and its 2014 annual report confirms the fact that its “average total payback payment” is $281.87. That’s less than many junior lawyers bill per hour these days.

This case shows fairly clearly some of the ways that things can go wrong at Board hearings.  The main problems appear to be as follows.

1.   Re:Sound greatly overstated and overreached in its initial proposal. In this fitness case, the Board knew, to its credit, that there was huge overreaching going on here. In its July 6, 2012 decision in this case from 2012, it said with uncharacteristic frankness:

[112] The quantum proposed by Re:Sound, $86
million, is at least five times as much as what
Re:Sound receives from commercial radio
stations. This offends common sense: all things
being equal, the value of sound recordings to
commercial radio must be much more than for
fitness centres
(emphasis added)

2.   As I earlier have blogged, five years and three months after this proposed Re:Sound “fitness” tariff was filed on June 2,  2007, and two years and two months after the hearing was finished, the Copyright Board determined in it July 6, 2012 decision that “The Board has rejected the expert evidence of Re:Sound and the Objectors as unreliable.” (Para. 162). Here is the list of the evidence, most of which the Board rejected and the parade of witnesses including the “experts” who presented all of the evidence that in turn led the Board to conclude that:

[162] The fact that evidence exists in the matter under consideration does not mean it is reliable. The Board has rejected the expert evidence of Re:Sound and the Objectors as unreliable. The Board has not rejected the factual evidence filed by the parties. As such, this makes it difficult to claim that there is no evidence whatsoever, a necessary criterion in the Other Sites decision. (emphasis added)

3.   Such a statement from the Board is really remarkable when considered in context. Even allowing for the partial - though not unlimited - latitude given to administrative tribunals concerning the normal rules of evidence, the Board has consistently shown an arguably unwarranted tolerance for hearsay and so-called “expert” evidence that would never see the light of day in a normal courtroom – and all of which takes up enormous amounts of time and expense and too often results in a standoff of unreliability. As for unreliability, The Board has seen some bad evidence over the years – including the flimsy and even fictitious. The Board has even imposed an expensive de novo $48 million interim tariff over the objection that “little evidence other than bald assertions” of counsel was before the Board, and even where there was no actual previous tariff was in place.  Still, taking all of this history of tolerance of dubious evidence into account, the Board found the expert evidence in this case to be “unreliable” all the way around. I haven’t looked at the actual evidence, but I can only surmise that it must have been remarkably unreliable indeed if even the Board itself says so. And names of well-known experts led by well-known counsel were involved.

4.   Nonetheless, the Board determined that there was enough factual evidence in this case to certify a tariff but based it instead upon a simple calculation flowing from some SOCAN agreements with various fitness centres and dance class providers provided by SOCAN at the Board’s request.

5.   The trouble was that the Board never heard from the parties about the SOCAN agreements, which the parties had never seen before the Tariff was certified. That was because the Board didn’t involve the parties in this extracurricular exercise. This was the Board’s unilateral  and no doubt well-intentioned idea to solve the problems left from a mound of evidence that the Board considered to be unreliable  and a lengthy hearing that must have cost the parties a fortune. Ironically, it seems that Re:Sound knew about and could have asked for and probably would have been given copies of the SOCAN agreements – but did not do so and instead waited and sought judicial review.

6.   As Justice John Evans, the  dean of administrative law in Canada, stated in the judicial review decision:

[74] In the absence of a request from experienced counsel acting for a sophisticated client, fairness did not, in the circumstances of this case, require the Board to disclose copies of the SOCAN agreements on its own motion. In my opinion, the Board did not unfairly deprive Re:Sound of its right to know and to respond to information in the Board’s possession. Rather, Re:Sound failed to avail itself of a reasonable opportunity to ask the Board to produce information that it knew was in the Board’s possession.

7.   Nonetheless, and despite Re:Sound’s failure to exercise its rights in a timely manner that might have saved a lot of trouble and cost, the Board’s well-intentioned but not well executed efforts were sufficient for the FCA to conclude that:

[81] Since the tariff set by the Board was based entirely on a methodology not raised as an issue at any point in the decision-making process, Tariff 6.B cannot stand. The matter must be remitted to the Board for redetermination of the royalties payable for the use of recordings of musical works in fitness classes after it has disclosed to the parties any information that it alone has on the ground on which it based its decision and has provided the parties with an opportunity to address it.

8.   After the matter was sent back to the Board for redetermination, the parties promptly reached a settlement, which is their right but which also requires the Board's approval because of the public interest "tariff" aspect. Under the circumstances, which included the sophisticated and representative nature of the parties, one might have expected prompt approval. However, the Board decided to recall a member who had been involved in the original hearing but who had retired from the Board in 2012. The Board also decided that the Board’s Chair, whose term expired on May 13, 2014, would remain involved on this file for what turned out to be almost a year after his retirement from the Board. It remains unclear why it took over a year essentially to approve a settlement between sophisticated parties, and why it was necessary that two retired Board members were involved. We also don’t know and won’t likely find out how much time the two retired members spent on the file and what additional costs were incurred by their post-retirement involvement. By the way, settlements are normally respected and encouraged by normal courts – even when major public policy issues are involved. Recently, a very major drug patent case with a host of interveners and enormous public policy implications was settled literally on the eve of a Supreme Court of Canada hearing and many important interveners were thus denied an opportunity to make their arguments as a result of this ultra-last minute settlement.

9.   Even at the redetermination stage, the Board was clearly troubled by the lack of evidence overall, but finally – after more than a year – relied on the settlement agreement, except for the provisions dealing with background music in fitness areas and for skating activities, which had been previously decided by the Board and not set aside by the Federal Court of Appeal. The Board noted:

[36] Third, since we have rejected the SOCAN Agreements as a basis for any rates in the tariff, we are in a difficult position given that Re:Sound is entitled to a tariff for the use of sound recordings in fitness and dance classes, that we are required to certify one, but that we do not have any usable evidence pertaining to the value of such tariff.

[37] The Settlement Tariff does however provide us with a basis for setting a tariff, which we consider fair and equitable. In the present circumstances, the exercise of the Board’s inherent discretion to consider the Settlement Tariff, under the aforementioned situation created by the absence of reliable evidence, is both reasonable and desirable.
(emphasis and highlight added)

So – the bottom line in this case as to why it took so long and why it has come to such an apparently indecisive, inconclusive  and delayed resolution in so many ways appears to involve the following factors:
  •  Initial overreaching by collective
  • “Unreliable” expert evidence all the way around 
  •  Procedural unfairness by the Board 
  •  Absence of reliable evidence, even at the redetermination 
  •  Long and inexplicable delay in redetermination – even with a settlement between sophisticated parties and their well-known counsel. In the Federal Court of Appeal and the redetermination, Re:Sound was represented by Glen Bloom of Osler’s, Goodlife by Andrea Rush (then of Heenan, Blaikie)  and the Fitness Institute of Canada by David Fewer, the Director of the public interest clinic CIPPIC  (apparently acting in this instance his private practice capacity).
 And why am I pessimistic that we have not yet seen closure on this tariff? It is the fact that the Board clearly indicated in the original decision that it expects better evidence next time.  This particular tariff was for the period of 2008-2012. This sort of disconcerting retroactivity is the way the Board now normally works. So, there will be another hearing sometime in the future to deal with the period after 2012. Also, there is the somewhat unsettling comment about the settlement, namely:
 [54] Second, the Settlement Tariff is substantially different from the tariff originally proposed which is the source of this proceeding, or the certified tariff that is currently applicable on an interim basis, since 2012. We have already discussed those differences. Certifying a new tariff with different rates and formulas could create administrative and financial difficulties if Re:Sound decides to collect royalties retroactively as adjustment payments would have to be recalculated. These difficulties could be exacerbated in cases where a user was not represented by the Parties during the negotiation of the Settlement Tariff. As such, the balance of convenience could lead Re:Sound to refrain from retroactively collecting royalties from users who have already paid under Tariff 6.B and who were not represented by the Parties during the negotiations leading to the Settlement Tariff.

The Board may also be suggesting in the recent decision that it is uncomfortable with the possibility of Re:Sound attempting to retroactively enforce  what may be higher rates for some entities that weren’t “represented by the Parties during the negotiation of the Settlement Tariff”.

Above all, the public interest factor is frustrated by the absence of a reasoned estimate as to how much this tariff will cost the Canadian public overall.

Once again, these developments only underscore the need that the Government should, at the earliest opportunity:
  • Appoint a Chair who is already knowledgeable about copyright and administrative law and possibly even other desirable areas such as competition or communications law and who is willing and able to deal with any issues that need to be dealt with inside the Board 
  • Implement regulations that could prevent the kind of problems and delays that are clearly evident in this and many other cases from happening again in the future.
HPK